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A NEW AGE OF UNDERSTANDING:
ALLOWING SELF-DEFENSE CLAIMS
FOR BATTERED CHILDREN
WHO KILL THEIR
ABUSERS
Abused children who commit parricide are presented as
criminals, yet surely they are victims first.'
The shocking crime of parricide, the murder of a parent or close rela-
tive by a child,2 accounts for roughly 300-400 homicide cases each year in
the United States.' The notion that children could kill their parents is
difficult for most people to accept.4 When children commit parricide,
however, the crime often follows a lifetime of severe abuse that the chil-
dren can no longer psychologically tolerate.5 Abused children view kill-
ing their parents as the only way to end the abuse.6
1. Mavis J. Van Sambeek, Parricide as Self-Defense, 7 LAW & INEO. J. 87, 91 (1988).
2. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 857 (1986). "The taboo against
parricide is strong- even stronger than the proscription of incest- but some children do kill
their parents." Lawrence Meyer, Kids Who Kill Parents, WASH. POST, May 13, 1984, (Mag-
azine), at W14.
3. PAUL MONES, WHEN A CHILD KILLS: ABUSED CHILDREN WHO KILL THEIR PAR-
ENTS 7 (1991). About four out of every five homicide victims are related to, or acquainted
with, their assailants. Id. at 27. One-fifth are murders among family members, the largest
single group being wives killed by their husbands. The next most prevalent group is chil-
dren killed by a parent. Parent killing is the rarest form of violence within the family. Id.
Almost three-fourths of parricide cases involve boys killing their fathers. Id. at 13. Girls
rarely kill their mothers. Id.
4. See id. at 8. "[Plarricide directly contravenes a universal religious and cultural
principle-children must venerate their parents," as expressed by the biblical phrase
"honor thy mother and father." Id. Parricide is also troubling because "it goes beyond
religious principles and challenges the very structure of society; it is truly the definitive act
of rebellion against the society's rules and order." Id. at 8-9.
5. Child abuse is the primary cause of parricide. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 104.
Parricide "is also an expression of family dysfunction .... a crime that could not take place
unless the family had created an untenable situation in which murder is a reasonable con-
clusion." Shelley Post, Adolescent Parricide in Abusive Families, 61 CHILD WELFARE 445
(1982). So many children have endured such relentless abuse that some psychiatrists con-
sider parricide "a sane reaction to an insane environment." Lois Timnick, Fatal Means for
Children to End Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1986, (Metro), at 1.
6. "The absence of a viable escape combined with long-term consistent and often
escalating patterns of unprovoked assaults may lead a battered child to strike back against
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Children who commit parricide often feel alienated by the courts,
which they look to for justice.7 When these children assert self-defense to
justify their actions, courts frequently reject the defense because it does
not conform to classic self-defense theory, which encompasses only those
who kill when confronted by an immediate and obvious threat to their
lives.' Children who kill their parents, however, normally strike when
parents are the most vulnerable, such as when they are sleeping or when
their backs are turned. Courts must recognize that in the mind of an
abused child, "the imminent dangeris more subtle and is only perceptible
to an abused child."9 Self-defense would then be available to a child who
commits parricide as an effective defense, as in any other homicide
case.'
0
Once a self-defense claim is allowed, expert testimony is needed to aid
the jury in interpreting the reasonableness of the child's belief of immi-
nent danger." Because the average juror has not been exposed person-
ally to the physical and psychological effects of the abuse, he or she
cannot understand the dynamics of the complex relationship between a
batterer and a victim. 2 A layman usually cannot comprehend the impact
long-term abuse has upon a child's emotional and psychological re-
sponses.13 Accordingly, expert testimony gives the jury critical informa-
the abuser in self-defense." Steven R. Hicks, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the
Psychology of the Battered Child, 11 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103 (1987).
7. Experts say that 95 percent of children who commit parricide face some type of
homicide conviction. Jana Mazanec, Murder or Victim? Town Rallies to Teen's Side, USA
TODAY, Nov. 12, 1992, at 2A.
8. Traditional views of self-defense "do not account for the unique psychological cir-
cumstances often present in the context of domestic violence." John N. Scobey, Self-De-
fense Parricide: Expert Psychiatric Testimony on the Battered Child Syndrome, 13
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 181 (1992). "[C]ourts must recognize the special nature of
the child's circumstances." Hicks, supra note 6, at 103.
9. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 90-91. Victims of child abuse learn how to predict
when their parents are going to abuse them; as a consequence, they are afraid even when
their parents do not confront them. Scobey, supra note 8, at 182. These children strike
back "out of a genuine fear for their lives." Id. at 181.
10. "A self-defense claim based on an understanding of the dynamics of family vio-
lence is not a request for special treatment, but is merely the defendant's assertion of [his
or] her right to equal and individualized treatment under the law." Joelle A. Moreno,
Killing Daddy: Developing a Self-Defense Strategy for the Abused Child, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1281, 1287 n.32 (1989).
11. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1031 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
12. State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 503 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
13. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1012 (Rose, J., dissenting). Battered children who are sub-
jected to constant abuse live in a completely different environment from that of other
children.
Self-Defense Claims for Battered Children
tion on battered children that they need to make an informed decision
regarding reasonableness. Without the expert testimony, the jury is not
able to evaluate properly a self-defense claim.
States are beginning to recognize the validity of the self-defense claim
for battered women who kill after years of abuse,' 4 but a similar defense
has not yet been extended to children, who kill abusive parents. The ori-
gin of the studies relating to abuse may explain why children receive
treatment different from battered women. For example, the battered wo-
men's syndrome 15 originated by focusing on the psychological effects of
abuse on women.16 In contrast, the battered child's syndrome originated
with medical research, focusing on the physical effects of abuse.' 7 Conse-
quently, the syndromes are not viewed as equivalent. The psychological
effects upon battered children mirror those of battered women,' 8 how-
ever, and self-defense claims in parricide cases are essentially identical to
those asserted when battered women kill their abusers. It is therefore
logical to extend the self-defense claim to children as well as women.19
Courts are slowly recognizing that women and children should be
treated similarly when they murder after years, or a lifetime, of family
violence. In 1991, the Texas legislature became the first in the country to
pass a gender-neutral statute allowing evidence of family violence to be
admitted when a woman or a child kills.2" In 1993, the Supreme Court of
Washington, in State v. Janes,2' concluded that "the battered child syn-
14. See infra note 110.
15. See Hicks, supra note 6, at 105; see generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN (1979).
16. Hicks, supra note 6, at 105:
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Moreno, supra note 10, at 1284.
20. In a concurrent resolution, the Texas Senate reported that a woman is beaten
every 18 seconds, and "in Texas alone more than 650,000 women are subject to abuse by
their husbands on a regular basis." Tex. S. Con. Res. 26, 72d Leg., 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [here-
inafter Texas Resolution 26]. In 60 percent of the homes where a woman is beaten, the
children are also abused. Most markedly, of boys ages 11 to 20 who have committed homi-
cide, 63 percent have killed a man who was abusing their mother. Id. One hundred thir-
teen out of more than 300 women convicted of murder or manslaughter in Texas killed
someone with whom they had lived. Kimberly Garcia, Provoked to Kill: SCR26 Reexam-
ines Family Violence, 55 TEX. B. J. 380 (1992). The concurrent resolution "was designed to
reevaluate cases ... where abuse might have been overlooked." Id. The Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice contacted eligible women with a letter that explained the resolu-
tion and "invited them to apply for review if they thought family violence provoked their
crime." Id. Subsequently,. the Texas Senate enacted TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06
(West Supp. 1991).
21. 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
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drome is the functional and legal equivalent of the battered woman syn-
drome. '22 The court held that evidence of the battered child syndrome is
admissible to prove self-defense, and expert testimony is allowed to help
the trier of fact understand this "little-known psychological problem. 23
This Comment argues that battered children must be afforded the same
defenses that are available to battered women.24 The effective assertion
of a claim of self-defense requires the admission at trial of evidence of
abuse, including expert testimony concerning the psychological effects of
abuse on a child. Section I presents a profile of battered children, explor-
ing the background and history of child abuse and parricide, the common
characteristics of battered children who kill, and why they commit this
crime. Section II discusses the traditional notions of self-defense and why
an objective standard of reasonableness is inappropriate in parricide
cases. Section II emphasizes the importance of expert testimony to aid
the trier of fact when evaluating a parricide self-defense claim. By show-
ing how battered women won the right to introduce expert testimony and
comparing battered women with battered children, this Comment dem-
onstrates the need for uniform treatment. Section III presents both past
and present statutory and judicial responses to parricide cases, focusing
on recent expansions of the battered child's defense. Section III con-
cludes with an analysis of how these recent developments reflect a new
understanding of the battered child and lend further support to the argu-
ment for uniform treatment for all abuse victims who kill. Section IV
offers a solution for admitting expert testimony relating to abuse in parri-
cide cases, concluding that all abuse victims merit equal protection under
the law. State legislatures must respond in order to achieve this goal.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ABUSED CHILD
Although the problems of child abuse and parricide have existed for
centuries, 25 they have long been hidden from the mainstream of societal
22. Id. at 503. The court recognized that "[g]iven the close relationship between the
battered woman and battered child syndromes, the same reasons that justify admission of
the former apply with equal force to the latter." Id. at 502.
23. Id. at 503.
24. This comment does not advocate violence. The author does not advocate a "li-
cense to kill for victims." See Henry J. Reske, License to Kill? Panelists Advocate Mercy,
Not Violence, 79 A.B.A. J. 37 (1993). After hearing all the evidence, the factfinder still
must decide whether a battered child had a reasonable fear of imminent danger when the
child killed its abuser.
25. Diana J. Ensign, Links Between the Battered Woman Syndrome and the Battered
Child Syndrome: An Argument for Consistent Standards in the Admissibility of Expert Tes-
Self-Defense Claims for Battered Children
violence.26 Because child abuse is a disturbing crime,27 many people
would rather not affirmatively acknowledge its existence.28 Furthermore,
because children have a traditionally subordinate legal status,29 and be-
cause physical discipline is emphasized in child-rearing in the United
States,3" the misconception that parents always act in the best interests of
their children is pervasive in our society.
Child abuse was first recognized as a real problem in this country in the
early 1960s. Child abuse became more easily detected with the develop-
ment of X-rays and the adoption of preventive programs.3 ' As a result of
increased awareness, society began to challenge the presumption that
timony in Family Abuse Cases, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1619, 1625 (1990) (noting that the first
reports of child abuse date as far back as the seventeenth century). For example, the case
of Lizzie Borden occurred in 1892. See MoNES, supra note 3, at 7. She was found not
guilty for the ax murder of her parents because "the crime was simply beyond the compre-
hension of the community; they could not bring themselves to believe, even with very con-
vincing evidence, that prim and proper Lizzie could have done such a thing." Id. at 8.
26. Society has been slow to accept that parents do not always fulfill their obligation to
love and care for their children. Moreno, supra note 10, at 1301. Children are also reluc-
tant to report the abuse, and the abuse is not considered wrong in the majority of violent
families. Id. at 1300. Moreover, many people think that what goes on between the walls of
a family's home is no business of anyone else. See Ensign, supra note 25, at 1625 (stating
that police intervention into family matters is not always encouraged).
27. Injuries from child abuse have included head injuries, broken bones, burns, rup-
tured internal organs, and human bites. R.H. Brown, The Battered Child Syndrome, 21 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 65, 66 (1976). Children have been confined and chained in rooms, sheds, or
basements, and some have been buried alive. Id. Some children have been strangled or
suffocated by pillows or plastic bags. Michael S. Orfinger, Battered Child Syndrome: Evi-
dence of Prior Acts in Disguise, 41 FLA. L. REV. 345, 350 (1989) (citing various studies).
28. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 90. The prosecutor in the Lizzie Borden trial stated
that parricide is "the most horrible word that the English language knows." MONES, supra
note 3, at 8.
29. Hicks, supra note 6, at 108. "[It has only been in the last one hundred years that
we have recognized through laws and social practices that children are independent beings,
entitled to protection from the excesses of their parents." MONES, supra note 3, at 32. For
example, in 1874, a young girl was found starving and chained to her bed. Since there was
no child protection agency at the time, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals removed her from her home. Id.
Historically, children were viewed as their father's property, and a father had absolute
power to discipline his children as he saw fit. Hicks, supra note 6, at 108. Children had no
rights in their families. Lynn Smith, What's Best for the Children?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1992, at El. In ancient Rome, fathers could "legally kill their children- based on the rea-
soning that those who gave life could also take it away." Id.
30. Hicks, supra note 6, at 108. There are two distinct models of abuse. Either the
parents have an honest belief that abuse is the appropriate way to reform or control the
child's behavior, or the parents are addicted to the power they have over the child and
derive pleasure from exercising this power. MONES, supra note 3, at 15.
31. Ensign, supra note 25, at 1625.
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physical force is always a parent's right and in the best interests of a
child.32 Nevertheless, society still refuses today to fully acknowledge the
extent and terrible reality of family violence.33
The battered child syndrome is rooted in medical research. 34 Dr. C.
Henry Kempe coined the term "battered child syndrome" in a 1962
study.35 Kempe used the term to "characterize a clinical condition in
young children who have received serious physical abuse, generally from
a parent or foster parent., 36 Early studies of child abuse focused on the
physical abuse, but eventually the psychological aspects were studied as
well.37 Because of its medical origins, however, battered child's syn'-
drome has not been officially recognized as a psychological syndrome,
which "may impede ... formal acceptance by courts of the syndrome's
legitimacy as a psychological disorder. '3' However, because modern
medicine treats battered child's syndrome as a valid psychological syn-
drome, courts should recognize it in the interests of fairness when bat-
tered children are on trial for killing their abusers.
Battered children live in an environment where severe abuse is fre-
quent and occurs randomly with or without warning.39 These children
32. E.g., Moreno, supra note 10, at 1300.
33. MONES, supra note 3, at 29. Society persists in its "idealization of the family as an
island of peace in a savage, chaotic world." Id. Society, especially through the mass media,
willingly acknowledges violence perpetrated by strangers, while incidents of family vio-
lence are drastically underreported by both victims and the media. Id.
34. Hicks, supra note 6, at 105.
35. Id. at 109; see C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17
(1962); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991) (holding that expert testimony
and evidence related to prior injuries were admissible to prove the "battered child syn-
drome" in a trial where the defendant was convicted of murdering his infant daughter).
36. Hicks, supra note 6, at 109. Kempe attempted to "identify and increase physicians'
awareness of the specific set of injuries while pointing out the non-accidental nature of the
injuries." Karla 0. Boresi, Comment, Syndrome Testimony in Child Abuse Prosecutions:
The Wave of the Future?, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 207, 210 (1989). Kempe's study
demonstrated that certain classes of injuries suffered by children were consistent solely
with physical abuse by their parents, and not by defects of the children. Id, at 207. It was
not until Kempe's seminal article that physicians began to accept the reality that parents
were intentionally inflicting abuse on their children. Id.
For a complete discussion on the origins of the battered child syndrome, see Orfinger,
supra note 27, at 348-53.
37. Hicks, supra note 6, at 110; see Milton Roberts, Annotation, Admissibility of Ex-
pert Medical Testimony on Battered Child Syndrome, 98 A.L.R.3D 306 (1980).
38. Hicks, supra note 6, at 111.
39. Id. at 103. "Battered and sexually abused children live in a world that is strikingly
different from the safe and nurturing home depicted by traditional values and social expec-
tations. Instead of being protected and cared for, these children are 'thrown into conflict,
confusion, insecurity, and anguish."' Moreno, supra note 10, at 1303.
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are physically, emotionally and/or sexually abused at levels that approach
torture.' Even if the physical or emotional abuse is not severe, "[tihe
assumption that relatively infrequent or milder forms of battering will
have little or no effect on the child's development is inaccurate. 41 On
the surface, these families appear close.4 2 But parents who abuse their
children often "perceive the act of conception as granting them absolute,
unfettered control over the life they have created."'43 The family often
isolates itself from outsiders who could detect abuse or render emotional
and financial support.' Even if other family members or outsiders do
know about the abuse, they most likely will not intervene.45
Abuse affects all aspects of a child's life. Battered children withdraw
and suppress their emotions, both in the dangerous environment of the
home, and outside the home.' Battered children frequently have a per-
40. Garry Abrams, Defender of the Indefensible, Paul Mones Sees Terrified Kids Where
Others See Parent Killers, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1989, Part 5, at 1 (quoting attorney Paul
Mones); see also 60 Minutes: Parricide 4 (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 29, 1992) (tran-
script at Burrelle's Information Services, Livingston, New Jersey) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
41. Moreno, supra note 10, at 1301. Abused children are desensitized to violence,
both the violence directed at them and at the people around them. Abrams, supra note. 40,
at 2 (quoting attorney Paul Mones). "What we're supposed to learn as children, that vio-
lence is bad, becomes so routine in your life and it becomes the primary problem solver,
it's not that hard to resort to." Id. (quoting attorney Paul Mones).
42. Carolyn Colwell, Defending Kids Who Kill Their Parents, NEWSDAY, Sept. 26,
1991, at 103 (quoting attorney Paul Mones). Parricide usually occurs in families that ap-
pear "normal" from the outside. Meyer, supra note 2, at W14. Because neighbors see the
killings as random events, they are often shocked by the crime and unable to imagine its
cause. Id.
43. MorEs, supra note 3, at 15. The abusive parents are "successful wage earners,
regarded by their peers as honest, hardworking people who have a reputation for perfec-
tionism both on and off the job." Id. at 14. They rarely violate the law, and tend to be very
private people. Id. After the murder, neighbors frequently comment that the parent was
"overly strict" or a "stern disciplinarian." Meyer, supra note 2, at W14. To understand
why these parents abuse their children, however, one must understand that "[elach [of
these parents] has been abused themselves in very terrible ways." Abrams, supra note 40,
at 2.
44. See Post, supra note 5, at 451. The parents want to keep the outside world from
penetrating the family boundaries. Id. Furthermore, social patterns in the United States
generally result in American nuclear families being physically and psychologically isolated.
Emanuel Tanay, Reactive Parricide, 21 J. FORENSIC Sci. 76, 81 (1976). "There are no aunts,
uncles, or grandparents to interfere or assist in day-to-day living." Id.
45. E.g., 60 Minutes, supra note 40, at 4-5.
46. Post, supra note 5, at 450. Most abused children suffer quietly. Anastasia
Toufexis, When Kids Kill Abusive Parents, TIME, Nov. 23, 1992, at 61. Many run away,
attempt suicide, or take out their repressed anger on someone else. Id.
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vasive sense of helplessness47 that results from feeling trapped in a situa-
tion from which they cannot escape.48 In fact, abused children often
develop a" 'concentration camp' mentality where they feel they have no
options and cannot leave home.",49 Battered children also suffer from
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), "an anxiety-related disorder
which occurs in response to traumatic events outside the normal range of
human experience."50
Another important characteristic of battered children is that of
hypervigilance:
a hypervigilant child is acutely aware of his or her environment
and remains on the alert for any signs of danger, events to which
the unabused child may not attend. The child's history of abu-
sive encounters with his or her battering parent leads him or her
to be overly cautious and to perceive danger in subtle changes in
the parent's expressions or mannerisms. Such 'hypermonitor-
ing' behavior, as it has been termed, means the child becomes
sensitized to these subtle changes and constantly 'monitors' the
environment (particularly the abuser) for those signals which
suggest danger is imminent.51
To understand the violent response of battered children, a juror must un-
derstand hypervigilance, and that battered children may perceive subtle
changes in their environment as creating a reasonable fear of imminent
danger that an outsider would not detect.52 Furthermore, these "special
perceptions" help to explain why children who have never before reacted
violently to more overt stimuli kill their abusers in comparatively less
47. Post, supra note 5, at 450. This is referred to as "learned helplessness." See infra
note 113 and accompanying text for a discussion on learned helplessness.
48. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 104. See infra note 112 and accompanying text for
a discussion on the cycle theory of abuse, which helps to explain why a victim does not
leave an abusive situation.
49. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 104. These children "resemble a suicidal profile
more closely than a homicidal profile." Id. Within six months of killing their parents, the
majority of youths have attempted suicide. Nancy Blodgett, Self-Defense: Parricide De-
fendants Cite Sexual Abuse as Justification, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 37 (quoting attorney
Paul Mones).
50. State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 501 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). "The resulting psycholog-
ical response to abuse-induced PTSD is often referred to as the 'battered child syndrome."'
Id.
51. Hicks, supra note 6, at 103-04. These children "develop 'a very finely tuned an-
tenna for impending violence'. . . ." Janes, 850 P.2d at 502 (quoting Dr. Lenore Walker).
52. Moreno, supra note 10, at 1286. "A subtle gesture or a new method of abuse,
insignificant to another person, may create a reasonable fear in a battered woman." Phyllis
L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 127 (1985).
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threatening situations.53
Precipitating events within the family typically begin about six months
before the homicide.54 Unable to perceive an alternative other than mur-
der to solve the conflict55 or to identify anyone who can help them,
56
these children frequently feel that if they do not act, they may be the
murder victim at the hands of their abuser.57 Because children are more
vulnerable to the effects of violence and have no independent ability to
support themselves, they cannot escape.58 They do not yet have the life
experiences on which to draw, and are unable psychologically to manage
the abuse by putting the battering into perspective.59 Thus, by the time a
court gets involved, it is usually too late to devise less extreme solutions.
The murders almost always occur when the abusive parent has little
opportunity to defend the attack.6° The circumstances often suggest an
53. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 98 (suggesting that the abused child seeks to;avoid a
threat suddenly introduced into the relationship).
54. Post, supra note 5, at 451. Children do not leave these situations for several rea-
sons. Most importantly, the children assume the blame for the abuse. E.g., MONES, supra
note 3, at 41. Children learn that the words of an adult are taken more seriously than their
own. Id. Children learn to adapt to their environment, trying to please their parents as
much as possible. Id. at 41-42. These children also do not label themselves as abused. Id.
at 42. The cycle continues because if the parent shows any love or caring, the children
hope that things will change for the better. Id.
55. Post, supra note 5, at 451. Battered children "internalize the abuse they see 'over a
long period of time' until they reach a 'breaking point."' Patricia Callahan, When a Child
Kills a Parent, Does Abuse Forgive the Act?, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1993, at 16 (quoting Joy
Byers, associate communications director for the National Committee to Prevent Child
Abuse).
56. Kathleen M. Heide, Why Kids Kill Parents, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 1992, at
64. Denial by other family members places responsibility on the child to solve the prob-
lem. Post, supra note 5, at 453. This problem is compounded by a lack of intervention by
other outside sources.
57. Blodgett, supra note 49, at 36 (quoting attorney Paul Mones). "[P]arricide... has
a large element of self-preservation." Tanay, supra note 44, at 76. The resulting situation
for the child is "either murder or suicide." Meyer, supra note 2, at W16.
58. These children cannot simply leave, because it is a crime for them to run away.
Even if they do consider running away, "[slurviving on the streets is hardly a realistic alter-
native for youths with meager financial resources, limited education, and few skills."
Heide, supra note 56, at 63. Furthermore, the child has always depended on the parent for
survival. Darrell Sifford, Parricide: A Child Paying Back Abuse, PHILA. INQ., Jan. 30, 1992,
(Magazine), at 5.
59. Hicks, supra note 6, at 124.
60. MONES, supra note 3, at 15. Unfortunately, "these circumstances make the killings
look like premeditated murder .... " Julie G. Shoop, Self-Defense Claims Gain Acceptance
in Parricide Cases, TRIAL, Mar. 1993, at 11 (quoting attorney Paul Mones).
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ambush,6' since the killing rarely occurs during verbal or physical
abuse. 2 This increases a child's likelihood of success since it may be the
only time the child can overpower the abuser.6 Another phenomenon is
"overkill," where a child shoots, clubs, or stabs the parent numerous
times.' Overkill has more to do with a child's fear of its parent than an
intent to inflict brutal injury.
Battered children who commit parricide are usually white middle
class 65 or upper-middle class boys between the ages of sixteen and eight-
een.66 They generally do well in school and have no history of delin-
quency or violent, assaultive behavior. 7 In many instances the children
suffer "poly-abuse," where they are physically, mentally, and often sexu-
ally abused over a period of years, and are likely to have witnessed the
repeated abuse of other family members.68 The children's target is most
often the father, and the typical weapon is a gun kept in the home.69
Following the murder, family members frequently state that they under-
stand the murder, and are relieved themselves.70 Furthermore, re-arrests
61. Killings typically occur when the parent is sleeping, watching television, or has his
or her back turned. E.g., MONES, supra note 3, at 15.
62. Id.
63. Toufexis, supra note 46, at 61. Unfortunately, "this makes the killing appear to be
cold-blooded murder." Id.
64. MoNES, supra note 3, at 15-16. For example, Donna Marie Wisener shot her abu-
sive father six times. The first of her six bullets would probably have killed him. David
Margolick, When Child Kills Parent, It's Sometimes to Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992,
at D20.
65. In the lower classes, social service agencies and police are "omnipresent." Coiwell,
supra note 42, at 103. Schools and teachers are watchful for signs of abuse. Id. Also,
children from lower classes are more likely to know where to go for help. Timnick, supra
note 5, at 3.
66. Adolescence is one factor for increased abuse in the family. Post, supra note 5, at
450. The adolescent's movement towards autonomy and changes in personality may result
in "remarkably negative responses." Id. The parents feel they are losing control over
their children. Id. During adolescence children do not comprehend the consequences of
their actions. MONEs, supra note 3, at 16. This makes a violent reaction more likely.
67. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 104. These children have none of the classic charac-
teristics of juvenile delinquents. Timnick, supra note 5, at 1. They are compliant, well-
mannered teenagers of whom people say, "It would never be so-and-so." Id. (quoting
attorney Paul Mones). "If they have a record, it is usually for victimless crimes such as
vandalism, shoplifting, or playing hooky." MONES, supra note 3, at 13. Lastly, at the time
of the crime, almost all of the children are sane. Abrams, supra note 40, at 2. Only a
fraction of them are psychotic or sociopathic. Timnick, supra note 5, at 3.
68. MONES, supra note 3, at 14. These children often become the protectors of their
abused younger siblings. Post, supra note 5. at 452.
69. Toufexis, supra note 46, at 60.
70. E.g., Post, supra note 5, at 454. After the killing, horrible consequences for the
family and the child usually do not develop. Id. The killing of the parent generally im-
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of the children are rare;71 in fact, the children are not dangerous or vio-
lent members of society once they kill the abusive parent.72
IL TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF SELF-DEFENSE
Homicide is justifiable as self-defense if: (1) the defendant acted with a
reasonable belief that he or she was in imminent danger of unlawful
death or serious bodily harm;73 (2)the use of force was necessary to avoid
the danger; and (3) the amount of force used was reasonable in relation
to the threatened harm.7 4 Most states require that one be in fear of im-
minent danger at the moment of the killing.75 Since traditional notions of
self-defense require that the defendant have a reasonable fear of death or
substantial harm, the reasonableness of the defendant's fear is measured
against one of three standards. First, an objective standard may be used
to measure the reasonableness of the defendant's perceptions and reac-
tions to the attack from the perspective of the ordinary person placed in
similar circumstances. 76 Second, a subjective standard, which is more
sensitive to the particular defendant's situation, requires only a good faith
and honest belief on the part of the defendant in the need for self-de-
proves family life and leads to "quite open relief and even rejoicing" on the part of family
members. Tanay, supra note 44, at 80. Additionally, the child and family experience little
guilt or mourning. The life of the child may also improve after the murder, depending on
the handling of the case. Id.
71. Post, supra note 5, at 454 (citing several studies).
72. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 104. Once the abusive parent is killed, the pressure
is removed from the child and he or she can now start over and become a normal member
of society.
73. This presupposes that with some overt act, the victim will manifest this threat of
serious harm immediately before the defendant takes action. Scobey, supra note 8, at 183.
"The law recognizes the right of a person to use force or even take life in defense of his/her
person." Gail Rodwan, The Defense of Those Who Defend Themselves, 65 MICH. B.J. 64
(1986).
74. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 91-92 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7, at 454 (2d student ed. 1986)). In many states, there is also a
"duty to retreat," where the defense of self-defense cannot be raised if there is any lapse
of time or any way the defendant could have escaped or avoided the conflict. Scobey,
supra note 8, at 183.
75. See Crocker, supra note 52, at 126 (noting that in traditional analysis, imminent
generally meant immediate); see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Official Draft 1985)
(stating that "the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of unlawful force by such other person ....") .(emphasis added).
76. Crocker, supra note 52, at 125. These standards are referred to as "reasonable
man" standards. Id. at 124. The objective standard ignores variations among people and
applies "only one standard of conduct to protect the general welfare." Id. at 125 n.11.
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fense.77 Third, a hybrid standard uses both objective and subjective anal-
yses. The jury must consider the defendant's perspective in evaluating
what "a reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances.
78
A. The Inapplicability of Traditional Notions of Self-Defense in
Parricide Cases
The traditional standard of self-defense is inappropriate with regard to
parricide cases. 79 First, the traditional self-defense doctrine "contem-
plates a man-to-man, stranger-to-stranger confrontation, which is charac-
terized as immediately violent and physically threatening."'8 Children
who kill their parents, however, do not fit this description. The children
know the decedent and, in most cases, an outsider would not perceive the
circumstances to be immediately violent or physically threatening. The
children often kill in a nonconfrontational situation, where the threat
does not seem immediate.8 ' Moreover, traditional self-defense is based
on a one-time confrontation,82 whereas children who kill base their de-
fense on a long history of abuse.
77. Id. at 125. A subjective standard is preferable in parricide cases because the de-
fendant is only required to have an honest belief in the need for self-defense. The history
of abuse and characteristics of the battered child are considered under the subjective stan-
dard. By contrast, the objective standard uses an ordinary person, or nonbattered person
to determine reasonableness.
78. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence; Battered Women
Who Kill Their Abusers, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1580 (1993) [hereinafter Developments
in the Law]. The Supreme Court of Washington employs a hybrid standard, stating "that
evidence of self-defense must be assessed from the standpoint of the reasonably prudent
person, knowing all the defendant knows and seeing all the defendant sees." State v. Janes,
850 P.2d 495, 504 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
79. Attorney Kenneth J. King states that "self-defense laws, designed for street fight-
ing men, cannot deal effectively with women who kill an abuser while he is sleeping or
hours after an assault." Reske, supra note 24, at 37. This observation applies equally to
parricide cases.
80. Scobey, supra note 8, at 182. Traditional self-defense laws were created so that if a
person were unlawfully attacked by another and lacked time to seek assistance from the
legal system, the person could take reasonable steps to defend his or her life. See Moreno,
supra note 10, at 1282; Crocker, supra note 52, at 123. The reason people have a difficult
time accepting that battered children are in fear of imminent danger at all times is that
something that might happen in the future is too vague and indefinite. It is much too
speculative for the child to react in such a way.
81. See Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1577. Even if the child, acting in
response to an immediate attack, responds with deadly force, an observer may not consider
the attack to pose a deadly threat. See id.
82. Rodwan, supra note 73, at 64. The law presumed that the person who was doing
the perceiving in a self-defense situation was a healthy adult male. Margot Slade, Justice is
Stretched to Allow Wider Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1988, at B5.
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Second, and more importantly, the determination of "reasonableness"
in parricide cases is extremely difficult.8 3 In applying an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness, the critical questions are whether the average
person in the child's position would believe that he or she was in immi-
nent danger at the moment of the murder, and Whether deadly force was
necessary.' This is problematic because "victims of domestic violence
have a special feeling of imminence-they have to live with the victim.""5
These children constantly fear for their lives. Therefore, the factfinder
must have knowledge of the abuse element to understand the child's per-
ceptions of danger and his or her need to use self-defense.'
No person who honestly believes herself/himself to be in danger
should be required to stop and assess the situation as others
might see it. And no jury that finds a defendant actually be-
lieved in the necessity of his/her actions should be required to
convict because a reasonable person might have believed
otherwise. 8'
Because an abuse victim's perceptions cannot be judged against what an
ordinary person would do in the same situation, "[t]he standard of rea-
sonableness for a self-defense defense must be what is reasonable to an
abuse victim."8 8 A subjective or hybrid standard must be used, and it is
critical that the factfinder understand the'effects of the abuse.
B. Expert Testimony as an Aid to Traditional Notions of Self-Defense
in Parricide Cases
In the traditional8 9 self-defense scenario, it is not necessary to rely on
expert testimony to explain the perception of the accused at the moment
of crisis when he or she resorts to the use of deadly force. 9° The jurors
83. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 92.
84. Id. Some decisions recognize a cumulative effect theory, which shows that cumula-
tive provocation that lasts over a substantial period of time may culminate in the killing of
the batterer. Rodwan, supra note 73, at 65. This theory shows how a battered person
"honestly or reasonably perceives herself or himself in almost constant danger of immedi-
ate bodily harm." Id.
85. Blodgett, supra note 49, at 37 (quoting attorney Paul Gianelli).
86. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 92. The evidence of the abusive relationship shows
the reasonableness of the child's deadly attack on the abuser. For this reason, Van
Sambeek argues that it is "vital that jurors are informed of the child's experiences as an
abuse victim" in order to determine reasonableness. Id.
87. Rodwan, supra note 73, at 64.
88. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 98-99.
89. In a traditional situation, a victim uses self-defense during an actual physical at-
tack. See Crocker, supra note 52, at 142.
90. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1013 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
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can put themselves in the shoes of the defendant and place themselves at
the murder scene to decide from their own experiences whether or not
the use of deadly force was reasonable. 91 In a nontraditional situation,'
however, the life experiences of the average juror are usually inadequate
to support an informed evaluation of reasonableness, 93 especially when
the facts of the case involve an area in which an average juror has no
knowledge. In such cases, the jury requires assistance from an expert wit-
ness. 94 In almost every parricide case, the expert is needed to educate the
judge and jury of the dynamics at work in a battering relationship. 95
TWo elements are required for the admission of expert testimony.96
First, the factual issues must be "beyond the ken of laymen., 97 Second,
91. Id. at 1014 (Rose, J., dissenting).
92. In nontraditional situations the physical violence may stop, but the defendant con-
tinues to have fear and kills at a time when the danger would not appear imminent to an
outsider. See Crocker, supra note 52, at 139. An example is when a woman kills her bat-
terer when he is sleeping, or when his back is turned.
93. See, e.g., Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1014.
94. Id. In these unusual situations, it is equally important to inform the jury of the
psychological factors that impact the defendant's behavior. Id. at 1016.
95. Ensign, supra note 25, at 1629-30. Expert testimony should be used with a hybrid
standard of reasonableness. The expert helps to explain why a child's unseemingly unrea-
sonable behavior is reasonable, and "how ordinary lay perceptions of how a 'normal' reac-
tion to a battering spouse [or parent] are at variance with the actual behavior and
mentality of battered women [and. children]". Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at
1580 (discussing expert testimony in the context of the battered woman syndrome).
96. Every jurisdiction has its own rules governing the admissibility of expert testi-
mony. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 362 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that many
courts apply special rules of admissibility when an expert is called to testify about scientific
findings). The notion of a special rule originated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. 1923). Under the Frye test, the proponent of the evidence must establish its rele-
vance and show "general acceptance of the principle in the scientific community." Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 362.
Other states have adopted a much more liberal standard, which is modeled after FED. R.
EVID. 702. Under FED. R. EvID. 702, the expert testifying must have scientific knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993).
In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, pro-
vide the standard for admitting expert testimony for trials in federal courts. id. The Frye
test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Some states, how-
ever, still apply the Frye test. See, e.g., State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 450, 501 (Wash. 1993) (en
banc) (analyzing the admissibility of the battered child syndrome under both the Frye test
and WASH. R. EVID. 702, which adopts the Federal Rule in its entirety).
97. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 21 (4th ed. 1992). "An intelligent evaluation
of facts is often difficult or impossible without the application of some scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge. The most common source of this knowledge is the expert
witness . . . ." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
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the testimony must aid the trier of fact "in the search for truth.""8  Even
if both of these requirements are met, to be admitted at trial the expert
testimony must be relevant and its probative value must outweigh the
unfair prejudicial effect to the opposing party.99
Expert testimony is vital in the parricide case because the expert is able
to explain to the jury all of the relevant considerations they must weigh
when evaluating the circumstances under the traditional notions of self-
defense. Because battered children perceive danger differently from
other children, expert testimony aids the jury in understanding the unu-
sual situation that battered children face. The jurors, comprised of ordi-
nary laymen, are unlikely to comprehend the reasonableness of the
child's fear if they have never been in such an abusive situation. Expert
testimony aids the jury in evaluating "the manner in which a battered
child perceives the imminence of danger and his or her tendency to use
deadly force to repel that danger."" This is especially crucial in the ab-
sence of a confrontation when an average juror would not see any threat
or impending danger.1 'O Furthermore, expert testimony shows how the
fear of imminent bodily harm was constantly present rather than appear-
ing only during beatings.'0 2 An expert explains the reasons for the child's
feelings of powerlessness, learned helplessness, being trapped, and theo-
rizes why the child did not fight back even after repeated assaults. The
expert also helps the jury understand critical factors in the child's back-
ground.10 3 There are many psychological reasons why a child stays and
endures the abuse." Understanding why an abused child remains in a
relationship and does not get any help from outside sources is beyond the
98. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 21.
99. Boresi, supra note 36, at 209. "Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.; see FED. R. EviD. 401, 403.
100. Hicks, supra note 6, at 104. "Effective expert testimony goes to the heart of the
self-defense issue by explaining how repeated physical and psychological abuse leads a
battered spouse to perceive herself/himself in imminent danger and to believe she/he must
respond with deadly force." Rodwan, supra note 73, at 66.
101. Scobey, supra note 8, at 191.
102. Id. at 188. Expert testimony shows the reasonableness of a child's belief that he or
she was in imminent danger of death or serious injury, even when the killing occurred in -"a
seemingly nonconfrontational setting." Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1580.
103. E.g., Scobey, supra note 8, at 188.
104. When a child grows up abused, he or she perceives the violence as normal and
does not realize it is something from which he or she should escape. Van Sambeek, supra
note 1, at 98-99. The child sees the abuser as omnipotent, not to mention the fact that the
size and strength of the abuser makes retaliation during an attack unlikely. There are also
various social and economic factors. Id.
19941
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common knowledge of the jury and therefore must be explained. 10 5
C. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Trials of Battered Women
and the Need for Uniform Treatment of Battered Women and
Battered Children
Expert testimony on the effects of abuse has been admitted in cases
involving battered women who kill their abusers.106 Cases of battered
women successfully asserting self-defense claims has altered the under-
standing of self-defense.0 7 Battered women's syndrome is defined as "a
constellation of common characteristics which are manifested by women
who have been abused physically and psychologically over a prolonged
period of time by the dominant male in their lives."' 8 Courts are divided
over the admission of expert testimony concerning the battered women's
syndrome when the testimony is used as an affirmative defense by women
who have killed their abusers.109 The general trend, however, is to recog-
nize the relevance of the expert testimony." 0 Experts attempt to de-
105. Hicks, supra note 6, at 127. The dynamics of child abuse are so foreign to the
average person that an expert explanation is required. Boresi, supra note 36, at 208-09.
Outsiders are not able to put themselves in the same situation and feel confident that they
would be able to leave or retaliate.
106. See generally James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opin-
ion Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R.4TH 1153 (1982).
Prior to the mid-1970s, when expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome was not
admitted at trial, women who killed their abusers in nontraditional situations often pleaded
guilty or claimed one of the various impaired mental state defenses, such as insanity, tem-
porary insanity, or diminished capacity. Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1577-
78. "It wasn't until the early 1980s that lawyers began introducing expert evidence about
the syndrome, based on a book by psychologist Lenore Walker, to bolster self-defense
theories." Reske, supra note 24, at 37.
107. Slade, supra note 82, at B5.
108. Hicks, supra note 6, at 112; see State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371-72 (N.J. 1984)
(stating that battered women "become so demoralized and degraded by the fact that they
cannot predict or control the violence that they sink into a state of psychological paralysis
and become unable to take any action at all to improve or alter the situation"); see also
WALKER, supra note 15, at 75.
[P]hysical abuse is accompanied by various forms of psychological abuse consist-
ing of excessive jealousy and surveillance by the abuser, isolation of the victim
from family and friends, verbal denegration, blaming the victim for the abuse,
threats against children, family, or pets, and alternating cycles of brutality and
mercy. The psychological response of a victim to these actions may frequently
consist of denial of the danger, passivity, shame and self-blame, unrealistic hope
that the situation will change, and emotional bonding with the perpetrator.
Judith A. Wolfer et al., Battered Spouse Syndrome: Legal Reform, 24 MD. B.J. 29, 32
(1991).
109. Hicks, supra note 6, at 113.
110. Id.; see Chapman v. State, 367 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Ga. 1988) (finding the evidence
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scribe the common social and psychological characteristics of battered
women.11' "Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome largely
consists of a description of the syndrome itself, particularly its two main
components-the 'cycle theory of violence"' 2 and the 'theory of learned
admissible as to self-defense); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (allowing
expert evidence on the battered woman's syndrome to support a self-defense claim); State
v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (N.H. 1980) (allowing battered wife testimony to rebut the
defendant's claim of insanity); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 374-79 (N.J. 1984) (holding that
expert testimony on the battered woman's syndrome is relevant to support the defendant's
claim of self-defense); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding evidence admissible as to past abuse and resulting psychological effects); State v.
Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Wash. 1986) (holding evidence admissible as to self-defense);
State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 555 (Wash. 1977) (holding the jury may consider the cir-
cumstances substantially before the act of self-defense); State v. Crigler, 598 P.2d 739, 741
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (same); State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 174-75 (Wis. 1983) (same).
There has also been a statutory trend by states to allow expert testimony for battered
women. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107(a) (West Supp. 1993) ("[E]xpert testimony is admis-
sible ...regarding battered women's syndrome, including the physical, emotional, or
mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence
.... "); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404(2)(a) (West Supp. 1992) ("[W]hen the accused
pleads self-defense and there is a history of assaultive behavior ... it shall not be necessary
to first show a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim.., and further
provided that an expert's opinion as to the effects of the prior assaultive acts on the ac-
cused's state of mind is admissible..."); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-916(b)
(1991) ("[W]hen the defendant raises the issue that the defendant was, at the time of the
alleged offense, suffering from the Battered Spouse Syndrome... the court may admit...
[e]vidence of repeated physical and psychological abuse ... and [e]xpert testimony on the
Battered Spouse Syndrome..."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993) ("Ev-
idence that the actor was suffering from the battered spouse syndrome shall be admissible
upon the issue of whether the actor lawfully acted in self-defense or defense of another.");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06(B) (Anderson 1991) ("the person may introduce expert
testimony of the "battered woman syndrome" and expert testimony that the person suf-
fered from that syndrome as evidence to establish the requisite belief of an imminent dan-
ger of death or great bodily harm that is necessary ... to justify the person's use of the
force in question.").
111. Moreno, supra note 10, at 1284. A growing number of courts have held that expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome is admissible to assist the jury's fact-finding
functions. See supra note 110. But "[a]lthough the present trend is to allow expert testi-
mony regarding the battered woman syndrome, even in those jurisdictions permitting this
testimony the courts have given inconsistent reasoning and have failed to define clear stan-
dards for admissibility." Ensign, supra note 25, at 1637.
112. Psychologist Lenore Walker developed a cycle theory of abuse. There are three
stages: (1) the tension building phase, where minor incidents of abuse occur; (2) the acute
battering incident with severe and uncontrolled abuse; and (3) the contrition stage where
the batterer acts with loving behavior, apologies, and promises of reform. Ensign, supra
note 25, at 1623-24; see WALKER, supra note 15, at 16, 42-55. "The third phase often re-
vives and reinforces a battered woman's hopes that her mate may reform and thus keeps
her emotionally attached to the relationship." Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at
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helplessness.""' 3 This information educates the judge and the jury about
the common experiences of battered women, and explains the context in
which they act." 4
In State v. Kelly,115 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant, convicted of murdering her husband, could introduce expert tes-
timony on the subject of the battered women's syndrome." 6 The court
found that expert testimony was admissible because the testimony related
to the issue of whether the defendant honestly and reasonably believed
she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at the time of
the incident." 7 Moreover, the conclusions of the expert were found reli-
able despite the novelty of the scientific research in the area. 18 The
court reasoned that the battered women's syndrome was, not within the
knowledge of the average juror, and an expert witness would clear up any
myths and misconceptions the jurors might have." 9 Kelly stands for the
proposition that battered women can establish self-defense as a legal de-
fense when they kill their spouse or lover after being abused.
Battered children deserve the same protection as battered women, if
not more. 20 Strong parallels exist between abused women who kill their
1579. Walker defines someone as a battered person if this cycle of abuse occurs two or
more times. Ensign, supra note 25, at 1624.
113. Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1578-79. One possible explanation as
to why women do not abandon their abusers is the theory of learned helplessness. "This
theory posits that, as a result of the battering relationship, a woman comes to believe that
her own behavior does not have any relationship to whether she is beaten." Id. at 1579.
She feels increasingly demoralized and paralyzed because she cannot anticipate or control
the abuse, and she is unable to act affirmatively to improve or alter her situation. Id.
Learned helplessness enables the woman to "cop[e] with the unpredictable nature of the
beatings and the extreme levels of pain." Ensign, supra note 25, at 1624. "Unfortunately,
members of society may view such behavior as the woman's acceptance of the violent at-
tacks against her." Id.
114. Ensign, supra note 25, at 1624. The experiences of the battered woman are seen as
outside the "ken of the average juror." Moreno, supra note 10, at 1284.
[An expert would explain the woman's] inability to leave despite such constant
beatings; her "learned helplessness"; her lack of anywhere to go; her feeling that
if she tried to leave, she would be subjected to even more merciless treatment; her
belief in the omnipotence of her battering husband; and sometimes her hope that
her husband will change his ways.
State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984).
115. 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984);
116. Id. at 373-78; see Ensign, supra note 25, at 1638.
117. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 373-78.
118. Id. at 379-81; see Hicks, supra note 6, at 114.
119. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377. Such misconceptions include the belief that battered wo-
men are masochistic and enjoy the beatings, or that they are free to leave at any time.
120. Because of their physical, emotional, and experiential weakness, battered children
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tormentors and abused children who commit parricide. 121 Battered wo-
men who kill usually do not have criminal records, are rarely arrested
after they kill their abuser, and are not otherwise threatening to soci-
ety.122 They suffer continual abuse, without outside help from society
and have little chance of improving their circumstances." 2 As with bat-
tered children, battered women feel that murdering their spouse or lover
is the only logical way out of the situation, 24 and both reasonably fear
their abusers at times when an outsider would not see cause for such
fear.125  An outsider does not know of the behavior patterns of the
abuser. As a consequence, battered women and children are in essen-
tially the same position when they lash out at their abuser, and both
should be treated under a uniform and fair standard.
III. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO PARRICIDE CASES
A. An Example of Classic Self-Defense at Work
In Whipple v. Duckworth,'26 the Seventh Circuit affirmed an Indiana
Supreme Court ruling that refused to allow a self-defense claim in a parri-
cide case. Dale and Penny Whipple had been subjected to physical and
mental abuse by their parents throughout their lives. 27 On January 1,
1985, Dale lured his mother into their garage where he killed her with
several blows of an ax.128 Dale then proceeded to his parents' bedroom
are clearly more vulnerable than battered women. These children are abused their entire
lives and "truly have no place to turn." Hicks, supra note 6, at 124-25. Furthermore, bat-
tered children's early experiences fail to provide a basic sense of trust which is critical to
the child's ability to ask for help. Id. at 124. These children are abused their whole lives
and "may be incapable of conceiving of an existence ... [without] abuse." Id. at 125.
121. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, it 92-93. The differences between battered woman
syndrome and battered child syndrome are "negligible." Hicks, supra note 6, at 106.
Therefore, since the overall psychological profile of battered persons is uniform, courts
should accept a "battered person" syndrome instead of trying to distinguish arbitrarily be-
tween abused women and children. Id.
122. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 93.
123. Id. Many women are not in the financial situation to leave their husbands. They
are not able to provide for themselves or their children. Furthermore, they oftentimes do
not have anyone else to turn to and confide in for help.
124. Stanton Peele, Getting Away With Murder, REASON, Aug./Sept. 1991, at 40.
125. Scobey, supra note 8, at 185. Since children are potentially more vulnerable than
battered women to the effects of the abuse, battered children sense danger more quickly
and are more likely to overestimate that danger. Hicks, supra note 6, at 126.
126. 957 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 218 (1992).
127. Id. at 419.
128. Id.
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where he killed his father with the same ax.129
The abuse in this family was severe. Dale and his sister were beaten
almost every day with a board their father called the "two-by-four.' 130
Dale sought outside help to no avail.' 3 ' At trial, he testified that he ex-
perienced extreme pain every day.' 32 Even with evidence of severe
abuse, however, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defense
of self-defense.' 33 The court held that self-defense could only be consid-
ered if Dale's parents were actually beating him at the time he killed
them.1' Dale was found "guilty but mentally ill" on two counts of mur-
der and was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty years for the murder
of his father and forty years for the murder of his mother. 135 The Indiana
Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the "threat of harm to Dale or his
sister was too temporally remote to be 'imminent' for the purpose of self-
defense or defense of others as a matter of Indiana law.' 136
The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the convictions, stating that Dale did
not give any evidence "from which an objectively reasonable juror could
have found he acted in self-defense.', 137 The court pointed out that, as a
court of limited jurisdiction, a federal court lacks authority to tell the In-
diana Supreme Court how to construe state statutes.'38 Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit's ruling affirmed the Indiana Supreme Court's interpretation
of the statutory term imminent as meaning "immediate.' 39 Because this
interpretation was not novel or unnatural, Dale did not have a constitu-
129. Mark Hansen, Battered Child's Defense: Youths Who Killed Relatives Offer Evi-
dence of Abuse With Mixed Results, A.B.A. J., May 1992, at 28. Dale did not run away
because he did not want to abandon his sister and he knew he could not care for her on the
streets. 60 Minutes, supra note 40, at 7.
130. Abrams, supra note 40, at 1. Dale stated that his father took pride in cutting,
sanding and making a nice handle on this two-by-four. Id.
131. Id. at 2. Dale stated that the neighbors, other family members, and teachers all
knew about the abuse, but no one wanted to get involved. 60 Minutes, supra note 40, at 6.
"[Tihey turned around and faced the other way." Id.
132. Whipple, 957 F.2d at 419.
133. Id.
134. 60 Minutes, supra note 40, at 7-8.
135. Whipple, 957 F.2d at 419.
136. Id. Because the father was asleep and the mother was not threatening her son at
the time of the killing, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the period of time between the
murders and the last physical assault inflicted on the children was too remote to be consid-
ered imminent for the purposes of self-defense. Id. at 419 n.1; see Whipple v. State, 523
N.E.2d 1363, 1365 (Ind. 1988).
137. Whipple, 957 F.2d at 424.
138. Id. at 422.
139. Id.; see IND. CODE §§ 35-41-1-25 and 35-41-3-2 (1985).
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tional right to present his defense to the jury."4 Whipple v. Duckworth
exemplifies how traditional notions of self-defense do not work in parri-
cide cases. Because imminent was construed by the court to mean imme-
diate, the jury was not able to evaluate the reasonableness of Dale's fear
of his parents through a self-defense claim.
B. A Plea to Allow Expert Testimony in Parricide Cases
In Jahnke v. State,'4' the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the trial
court ruling that disallowed expert testimony from a forensic psychiatrist
to explain a battered child's perceptions of danger.' 42 Richard Jahnke
was beaten beginning at the age of two.' 43 On the night of November 16,
1982, he ended that abuse by shooting his father four times outside their
home in Cheyenne, Wyoming.' Richard was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter and sentenced to five to fifteen years in the Wyoming State
Penitentiary.'45 Richard appealed, arguing that the trial court committed
reversible error by refusing to admit expert testimony on the psychology
of battered children as part of his self-defense claim.' 4 6 The Supreme
Court of Wyoming affirmed his conviction, rejecting that argument and
holding that expert testimony was inadmissible and that "self-defense is
circumscribed by circumstances involving a confrontation, usually encom-
passing some overt attack by the deceased., 47
140. Whipple, 957 F.2d at 423. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that Dale did not offer
any evidence to support the showing required under Indiana law: that he "reasonably
believed that his mother and father posed a present threat to himself or his sister at the
time of the killings." Id. at 423-24.
141. 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984). For a full discussion of the Jahnke case, see Hicks, supra
note 6, at 131-41.
142. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1004.
143. Id. at 1018 (Rose, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 995. On the night of the murder, Richard's parents went out to dinner.
Before they left, his father told Richard, "I don't want you to be here when I get back,"
and "I don't care what I have to do, I'm going to get rid of you." Id. at 1015 (Rose, J.,
dissenting). These two statements precipitated Richard's fear of imminent danger for his
life. Furthermore, when his parents returned, his father "stomped" up the driveway. Rich-
ard knew from past experience that "when his father 'stomped' after him that he was in for
a beating." Id.
145. Id. at 993. Voluntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense of first-degree
murder. Id.
146. Id. at 995. The court allowed an instruction regarding self-defense to the jury.
This instruction, however, was useless because the jury was not able to understand why
Richard feared he was in imminent danger on the night of the murder. Expert testimony
was critical to explain how Richard's perceptions fit the self-defense model, namely that he
was in constant fear for his own life.
147. Id. at 997.
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Justice Rose's dissent in Jahnke argued that the expert's testimony
should have been admitted. Justice Rose stated:
It is my position that, since the issue of self-defense in the unu-
sual behavioral circumstances of this case is a subject which is
cloaked in the abstract mysteries of professional knowledge, the
jury, deprived of an expert's explanation of how battered people
perceive and respond to the imminence of danger, could not be
expected to and did not understand and quantify the impact and
residuals of the years and years of battering which had been the
lifelong fate of Richard Jahnke. 48
The dissent took into account the severe abuse that Richard and his fam-
ily had endured, a factor that the majority disregarded. In Justice Rose's
view, additional facts regarding the abuse were critical to the jury's ability
to evaluate adequately Richard's claim of self-defense. 149 According to
Justice Rose, without this evidence, the jury was unable to fully under-
stand Richard's actions.
C. A New Understanding of the Battered Child
1. Texas: Statutory Response to Battered Children Who Kill
In 1991, Texas became the first state to pass a law permitting a person
accused of killing a family member to offer evidence of prior abuse in-
flicted by his or her victim.' 50 Expert testimony on the distinctive psy-
Absent a showing of the circumstances involving an actual or threatened assault
by the deceased upon the appellant, the reasonableness of appellant's conduct at
the time was not an issue in the case, and the trial court; at the time it made its
ruling, properly excluded the hearsay testimony sought to be elicited from the
forensic psychiatrist.
Id. at 1007.
148. Id. at 1012 (Rose, J., dissenting). Justice Rose stated further that there was no way
the jury could know whether Richard's acts at the time of the murder "were those of the
reasonable person similarly situated for whom the law of self-defense provides comfort."
Id.
149. Id. at 1016 (Rose, J., dissenting).
150. Hansen, supra note 129, at 28. Five other states also allow such evidence, but only
with respect to battered women. Margolick, supra note 64, at Al.
A movement by battered women's groups in California resulted in the enacting of CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993), which allows the admission of expert testimony on
battered women's syndrome at trial. In August of 1992, children's organizations rallied to
have the statute expanded to children, but the bill never made it out of committee. Tele-
phone Interview with Paul Mones, Attorney for Children who Commit Parricide (Oct. 9,
1992).
Furthermore, in Maryland, which has a statute regarding battered women, the legislature
failed to enact similar protections for battered children when a bill was under debate in the
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chology of the victims of battering can be introduced by both women and
children. The statute states:
In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, if a defendant
raises as a defense a justification 5' . . . the defendant, in order
to establish the defendant's reasonable belief that use of force
or deadly force was immediately necessary, shall be permitted to
offer: (1) relevant evidence that the defendant had been the vic-
tim of acts of family violence' 52 committed by the-deceased...;
and (2) relevant expert testimony regarding the condition of the
'53mind of the defendant at the time of the offense ....
The legislature noted that "most battered women who kill their abusers
have previously attempted, without success, to protect themselves or their
children in other ways from battery and later are held to an unreasonable
standard of justification when they try to assert their right to self-defense
in court .... ,,4 With this statute, they will be able to prove that their
fears were subjectively reasonable. 55
In a concurrent resolution, the Teias Senate reported that even if the
homicide occurred after years of severe, well-documented abuse, bat-
tered women were held to an unreasonable standard of justification in
Spring of 1993. Sandy Banisky, Abuse As a Child Led Her to Kill Parent, Inmate Says,
BALT. MORNING SUN, June 13, 1993, at 1A.
151. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31 - 9.33 (West 1991) (addressing self-defense,
use of deadly force in defense of person, and defense of third persons).
152. Family Violence is defined as:
an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the
family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault, or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault ......
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01(b)(2) (West 1993).
153. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06(b)(1)-(2) (as amended Sept. 1, 1991). The Texas
legislature passed a similar bill in 1989, which was vetoed by the Governor. Texans Say
Jurors Should Hear of Abuse in Murder Trials, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 18, 1991, at 1D.
The legislature felt the need for the change due to the fact that the previous provision of
the penal code was "too vague" and was left "open to each judge's interpretation." Id.
Also, despite some case law admitting the evidence, many attorneys, and even a few judges
were not aware of the case law. Id. at 8D. Therefore, clarification was needed by the
legislature.
154. Texas Resolution 26, supra note 20, at 1. The Legislature recognized that the "vic-
tims are not common criminals who killed for profit or vengeance; rather, they are people
like ourselves .... who were driven by an unthinkable set of circumstances to perform this
last desperate act of self-preservation." Id. at 2.
155. Margolick, supra note 64, at 1. One hundred sixteen female inmates meet the
criteria outlined in the Texas Resolution "that calls for re-examining cases where family
violence may have provoked an individual into committing manslaughter or murder."
Garcia, supra note 20, at 380.
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asserting self-defense.156 Therefore, women were victimized twice; once
by their abusers and later by the legal system's failure to recognize the
validity of their defense.' 57
The first use of the Texas statute in a parricide case involved Donna
Marie Wisener, a seventeen year old girl who claimed that she killed her
father in self-defense. 5 ' She endured her father's explosive rage and se-
vere abuse until May 24, 1991, when she shot him six times with his re-
volver at their home. 5 9 Donna's father physically and sexually abused
her from the time she was two or three years old, and Donna knew that
he abused her mother as well.1" She was acquitted under the new Texas
statute after the jury was allowed to hear not only testimony about the
abuse from Donna and her mother, but also expert testimony regarding
the effects of the abuse. If she had killed him a year earlier, it would have
been within the trial judge's discretion to admit the evidence of abuse and
the expert testimony. 16  The outcome of this case under the new law
shows how evidence of family violence influences a jury in deciding
whether or not an abused child who kills acts in self-defense.
2. Appellate Recognition of the Importance of the Battered Child's
Defense
In State v. Janes,1 62 the Supreme Court of Washington "became the first
high court in the nation to recognize battered-child syndrome, ruling it
could be admissible in appropriate cases to aid in proving self-de-
fense."' 63 The court held that expert testimony regarding the battered
child syndrome is "generally admissible in appropriate cases to aid in the
proof of self-defense."'' Moreover, the court concluded that "the bat-
156. Texas Resolution 26, supra note 20, at 1.
157. Id. at 2.
158. James Anderson, Attorney Defends Children Who Kill a Parent, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
5, 1992, (Bulldog Ed.), at B3.
159. Id.
160. Hansen, supra note 129, at 28. Her father "handcuffed her to a chair for his
amusement or, when her report card was unsatisfactory, beat her into unconsciousness."
Margolick, supra note 64, at 1. He used to beat her with branches from a backyard tree. 60
Minutes, supra note 40, at 3. She was never taken to the hospital or treated by a doctor.
Id. at 4. He also gave her "'rub downs' and sent her sexually suggestive Valentines."
Margolick, supra note 64, at 1.
161. 60 Minutes, supra note 40, at 5. There is a good chance that the evidence would
have been excluded if the issue had been left to the trial judge's discretion.
162. 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
163. Jolayne Houtz, "Battered Child" Defense Gets a Test, SEATTLE TIMES, June 3,
1993, at Al.
164. Janes, 850 P.2d at 496.
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tered child syndrome is the functional and legal equivalent of the bat-
tered woman syndrome.' 165
On August 30, 1988, Andy Janes shot and killed his stepfather, Walter
Jaloveckas, as he returned home from work. 66 Andy reacted to many
years of severe abuse to himself, his brother, and his mother. The abuse
included severe physical and mental abuse, including threats to torture,
kill or send the children away from their mother. 167 .Andy's stepfather
frequently hit him over the head with firewood, beat him unconscious,
and threatened to kill him if he called the police. 68 Despite evidence of
500 incidents of abuse, the trial judge rejected proffered evidence that
Andy constantly felt himself to be in imminent danger from his stepfa-
ther, that is, that he suffered from battered child syndrome. 169 The trial
court ruled that Andy failed to show that he was in imminent danger at
the time he shot his stepfather. 170 Consequently, there was an insuffi-
cient factual basis to justify instructing the jury about the law of self-de-
fense.17' Andy was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced
165. Id. at 503.
166. Id. at 497. Andy then triggered the alarm system at his house to summon the
police, the fire department, and the rescue squad. Andy fired at the police, parked cars,
and the telephone in his home. A police officer and a bystander were slightly injured. Id.
167. Id. at 499. Walter Jaloveckas moved in with Andy's family in November of 1978
when Andy was seven years old. Id. at 496. When the family moved into their own home
in 1980, Jaloveckas "became increasingly abusive and subject to unpredictable and some-
times physically violent outbursts of anger." State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992), rev'd, 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
168. D.M. Osborne, Solo Wins Right to Battered-Child Defense, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992,
at 119. Other examples of abuse include being beaten with a belt or wire hanger, a plastic
piggy bank, or a map. Janes, 850 P.2d at 499. Jaloveckas smashed Andy's stereo with a
sledgehammer. Jaloveckas also threatened to nail Andy's hands to a tree, brand his fore-
head, place his fingers on a hot stove, break his fingers with a hammer, and wrap a crowbar
around his head. Andy feared that Jaloveckas would kill his mother, his brother and him-
self. The abuse was reported to Child Protective Services (CPS) on at least three occa-
sions, but no follow-up occurred. Id. At least twice, Ms. Janes or Andy asked CPS not to
follow up for fear of provoking more severe abuse from Jaloveckas. Janes, 822 P.2d at
1240.
169. Osborne, supra note 168, at 119.
170. Andy offered the defense of self-defense based on the history of abuse by
Jaloveckas. Janes, 850 P.2d at 498. He hoped to show that he was in fear of imminent
danger on the evening of the shooting. Andy also offered the defense of diminished capac-
ity, arguing that "his capacity to premeditate and to form intent was diminished by the
abuse he had suffered and from his use of drugs and alcohol." Id.
171. Id. at 498. The trial judge found that "Walter's confrontation with Gale [Andy's
mother] the night before, his unknown comment to Andrew that same night, and Gale's
statement the next morning that Walter was still mad were insufficient to establish immi-
nent danger." Id. The trial judge stated that these events were "too remote and insuffi-
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to ten years in prison,' 72 Andy appealed, assigning error "to the trial
court's failure to allow an instruction on self-defense and to various evi-
dentiary rulings excluding expert testimony regarding the battered child
syndrome that he contends would have been relevant to establishing that
defense.'73
The Court of Appeals reversed Andy's conviction, holding that the ex-
pert testimony about the battered child syndrome should have been ad-
mitted to develop the defense of self-defense. The court stated that if the
defendant produces any evidence which tends to show self-defense, then
the issue of self-defense is properly raised.174 When the trial court ques-
tions whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a claim of self-defense,
a subjective standard is used, requiring that "the jury ... evaluate the
reasonableness of the defendant's perception of the imminence of that
danger in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the defendant
at the time he acted.' 175 Furthermore, expert testimony is needed to aid
in the establishment of a defense of self-defense. 176 The court concluded
that the "battered child syndrome is the functional and legal equivalent of
the battered woman syndrome, and ... that scientific understanding of
the battered child syndrome is sufficiently developed to make testimony
concerning that syndrome admissible in appropriate cases. ' 177
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial
court. Washington's highest court stated that there was nothing in the
record that indicated that "the trial court considered the [self-]defense
ciently aggressive to justify a self-defense instruction." Id. at 498-99. The trial court did
instruct the jury on diminished capacity. Id. at 499.
172. Appeals Panel: Battered-Child Defense Is OK in Court, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 4,
1992, at B2. "Andy was charged by information with one count of murder in the first
degree (premeditated), and two counts of assault in the second degree." Janes, 822 P.2d at
1240. The standard sentence for his conviction was 13 to 18 years. Id. at n.2.
173. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1239.
174. Id. at 1241. There does not need to be evidence of an actual physical assault when
the jury considers the immediacy of the danger. Id.
175. Id. at 1242 (quoting State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977)).
176. Washington courts have held that expert testimony is admissible regarding the bat-
tered women's syndrome. See State v. Walker, 700 P.2d 1168 (Wash. 1985) (holding that
the purpose of expert testimony is "to assist the trier of fact in evaluating the reasonable-
ness of both the use of force and the degree of force used .... " The perceived imminence
of danger supplies the justification to use deadly force under a claim of self-defense).
177. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243. "There is a sufficient scientific basis to justify extending
the battered woman syndrome to analogous situations affecting children." Id. at 1242. The
rationale that underlies the admission of expert testimony of the battered woman syn-
drome is "at least compelling, if not more so, when applied to children." Id. at 1243.
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evidence in light of Andrew's subjective knowledge and perceptions.' '17 8
Therefore, the consideration of the motion for a self-defense instruction
by the trial court was incomplete, and the trial court was instructed to
reconsider its ruling in light of the supreme court's opinion.17
9
State v. Janes is a landmark case for children's rights. The court made a
series of findings that are crucial in giving battered children the protec-
tion they deserve. First, the court recognized that the battered child syn-
drome is a psychological, as well as a physical syndrome. 180 Victims of
chronic abuse suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which
occurs "in response to traumatic events outside the normal range of
human experience."'' These victims share a common characteristic
called hypervigilance. 82 The court acknowledged that children who suf-
fer from prolonged abuse develop "a very finely tuned antenna for im-
pending violence [which] .. .picks up low-level cues that people who
have not been traumatized would not see.' 8 3 The court also recognized
that another key characteristic of battered children is learned helpless-
ness, which causes abused children not to seek outside help."8 To abused
children, "all doors of escape appear closed."' 5
Second, the supreme court saw no reason to treat battered women and
battered children differently:
If anything, for battered children, the effects of PTSD are ampli-
fied. Children are entirely dependent on the parent for financial
and emotional support. They-are extremely vulnerable and tend
to place great trust in their parents. It is not as easy for a child
as it is for an adult to leave a troubled home .... Moreover,
unlike the battered adult, a child has no outside context with
178. State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 506 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
179. Id. The Washington Supreme Court directed that "[ilf the trial court determines
that some evidence existed to justifi a self-defense instruction, then it should order a new
trial. Otherwise, Andrew's conviction stands, subject to a continuation of the normal ap-
peals process." Id.
180. Id. at 502. The court recognized that the battered child syndrome was originally
developed as a physical diagnosis for describing child abuse, but has grown to include psy-
chological effects as well. Id. at 501.
181. Id. "The resulting psychological response to abuse-induced PTSD is often referred
to as the 'battered child syndrome."' Id.
182. See supra note 51 and accompanying text for a discussion of hypervigilance.
183. lanes, 850 P.2d at 502 (quoting attorney Paul Mones).
184. Id. ,
185. Id. The court recognized that battered children often seek help from outside
sources, but to no avail. Id. Furthermore, family members are unable to help because they
are often being abused too. Id.
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which to compare the abusive reality.'
The court further reasoned that the same reasons that made evidence of
the battered woman syndrome helpful in self-defense cases apply equally
to the battered child cases. 187
Third, the court stated that in determining the reasonableness of a
child's perceptions, a hybrid, or a mixed objective and subjective stan-
dard, is used.' 88 The jury must consider all of the facts and circumstances
known to the child at the time of the killing, including those that precede
the killing.189 "The self-defense evaluation is objective in that the jury is
to use this information in determining what a reasonably prudent [per-
son] similarly situated would have done."'" In addition, the subjective
standard allows the jury to inquire "whether the defendant acted reason-
ably, given the defendant's experience of abuse."' 91
Fourth, the supreme court recognized that the jury cannot subjectively
evaluate the reasonableness of a battered child's fear of imminent danger
without the help of expert testimony. 92 "Expert testimony on the bat-
tered person syndromes is critical because it informs the jury of matters
outside common experience.' 93 An expert explanation of the battered
child syndrome assists the jury in understanding the circumstances that
surrounded the homicide, because battered child syndrome is "a phenom-
enon [that is] not within the competence of an ordinary lay person.' 194
Lastly, the court distinguished imminent harm from immediate harm
when evaluating self-defense.' 95 The self-defense statute in Washington
only requires imminent fear, and "imminence does not require an actual
186. Id. at 502-03. "Given the close relationships between the battered woman and
battered child syndromes, the same reasons that justify admission of the former apply with
equal force to the latter." Id.
187. Id. at 503.
188. Id. at 504. "This approach to self-defense provides balance to our jurisprudence.
The subjective aspects ensure that the jury fully understands the totality of the defendant's
actions from the defendant's own perspective." Id. at 505; see supra note 78 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion on the hybrid standard to determine reasonableness.
189. Janes, 850 P.2d at 504.
190. Id. (quoting State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977)).
191. Janes, 850 P.2d at 505. This standard helps the jury to understand the totality of
the defendant's actions from that defendant's own perspective, not the perspective of the
reasonable person. Id. at 504-05 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 503. The court analyzed the admission of expert testimony under both the
Frye test and WASH. R. EVID. 702 (adopting FED. R. EVID. 702 in its entirety). Id. at 501.
Expert testimony on the battered child syndrome satisfied both tests. Id. at 503.
193. Id. at 505.
194. Id. (quoting State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)).
195. Id. at 506.
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physical assault." '196 A threat, or its equivalent, could establish sufficient
imminent fear when there is a reasonable belief that the threat could be
carried out.1 97 The court noted:
That the triggering behavior and the abusive episode are divided
by time does not necessarily negate the reasonableness of the
defendant's perception of imminent harm. Even an otherwise
innocuous comment which occurred days before the homicide
could be highly relevant when the evidence shows that such a
comment inevitably signaled the beginning of an abusive
episode. 98
Based on these factors, the court remanded the case to the trial court
to determine whether a jury instruction about self-defense should have
been allowed. The court set out a very specific framework, marking a
victory for battered children in Washington. The state now allows chil-
dren to introduce both evidence of severe abuse and expert testimony
about the complex psychological processes that can affect the battered
child.
D. Analysis of the Statutory and Judicial Treatment of Parricide Cases
The Texas statute and the decision in Janes represent a new under-
standing of the plight of battered persons. "[U]ntil very recently these
[parricide] cases never saw the light of day. Kids pleaded guilty to long
prison terms or went into mental hospitals."' 99 Texas and Washington,
however, now recognize that these children are not taking the lives of
their parents in random acts of violence, but are defending themselves
because they genuinely fear for their lives.2°°
The majority decision in Jahnke illustrates the common misconceptions
surrounding the admission of expert testimony. The majority stated that
"the essential questions presented in this case arise out of a notion that a
victim of abuse has some special justification for patricide." 20 ' The court
did not allow the expert testimony because it felt that there had to be
some overt act on the part of the decedent "which would induce a reason-
196. Id.
197. Id. "Especially in abusive relationships, patterns of behavior become apparent
which can signal the next abusive episode." Id.
198. Id.
199. Abrams, supra note 40, at 1 (quoting attorney Paul Mones).
200. "[Njobody takes the life of the person who's given them life unless there's some
real serious reasons for it." Colwell, supra note 42, at 103 (quoting attorney Paul Mones).
When a parent is killed, a child's physical and psychological survival is at stake. Id.
201. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 993 (Wyo. 1984).
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able person to fear that his life was in danger or that at least he was
threatened with great bodily harm."202 The Jahnke court, however, failed
to understand the purpose of the expert testimony. Richard Jahnke of-
fered the expert testimony to explain why, even though there may not
have been an overt act by the decedent, he reasonably feared for his life.
In order for the jury to adequately evaluate his claim of self-defense, the
specific facts and circumstances surrounding the killing were essential to
understanding Richard's fear of imminent danger.
The'Texas statute is an excellent example of the protection battered
children need. The statute not only admits evidence of the abuse that
occurred throughout the child's life, but also admits expert testimonyto
explain how the abuse affects the child's perceptions. As a resultof this
law, all children in Texas are afforded this protection, without interfer-
ence on a case-by-case basis by a particular trial judge. Similarly, in
Janes, the Supreme Court of Washington understood that battered chil-
dren perceive danger differently from nonbattered children. The court
recognized that expert testimony is helpful to aid the jury when evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of a child's perception of imminent danger of
death or serious bodily harm at the time of the killing.20 3 This decision
marks the legal direction necessary to give battered children equal pro-
tection under the law. The decision recognizes the complex dynamics of a
battering relationship and affords critical expert testimony so the average
juror may make an informed decision on the evidence presented.204
In contrast, the Whipple court misunderstood the complexity of the
battering relationship and refused to allow the defense of self-defense,
much less expert testimony on the psychology of the battered child.2 5
Indiana's narrow reading of imminent as immediate ignores the real rea-
son why battered children kill when their abuser is defenseless. Expert
testimony on behalf of Dale Whipple would have enabled the jury to un-
derstand how factors such as hypervigilance made his fear of imminent
202. Id. at 997. The court stated that "to permit capital punishment to be imposed upon
the subjective conclusion of the individual that prior acts and conduct of the deceased
justified the killing would amount to a leap into the abyss of anarchy." Id. But a look at
the subjective perceptions of the battered child is critical. Battered children do not per-
ceive danger in the same way that normal children do. They have a very finely attuned
sense of danger, and often feel as if their life is in danger at times when a nonbattered
person would not understand.
203. State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 503 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
204. Id.
205. Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418, 423-34 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
218 (1992).
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danger a constant one.2°
Both Texas and Washington recognize that battered children should be
accorded the same rights as battered women,2" and that consistent stan-
dards are essential to ensure that battered women and battered children
receive fair adjudication.2" Texas extends its statute to battered children
as well as women. The Janes court recognizes that the "battered child
syndrome is the functional and legal equivalent of the battered women
syndrome.,,2 1 This analogy is crucial because battered children essen-
tially are in the same situation as battered women. Consequently, the
two problems must be approached in conjunction with one another.210
"Slowly, as with battered women cases, we're seeing a trend towards
more understanding" of the circumstances of battered children.21
As with battered women cases, misconceptions pervade jurors' minds
during trials of children who have killed their parents.212 These miscon-
ceptions, if not identified and corrected, cause jurors to draw improper
conclusions upon which to base their verdicts. Jurors who believe that
the child possessed a less drastic option may not understand why the child
felt that he or she had to kill the parent to end the abuse. Jurors must
understand that an abused child lives in constant fear of being killed by
his abuser and thinks the outside world is unable to help. Furthermore,
206. For a discussion of hypervigilance, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
207. For states that have enacted statutes or admitted evidence on the battered women
syndrome, it is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, it is not far enough because
children who are victims of family violence are deprived of a valid defense when they
strike back at their abusers. Paul A. Mones, Battle Cry for Battered Children, 12 CAL.
LAw. 58 (May 1992). Mones notes that "teenagers Who have killed abusive parents have
been specifically excluded from gubernatorial review in those states who have granted par-
dons to women." Id. He also notes that he has found "attorneys and judges to be naive, at
times even brutally insensitive to the fact that the attacks visited on the child are qualita-
tively different from the violence one adult perpetrates on another." Id.
208. There is no uniformity in state law or among judges. Some judges acquit the chil-
dren or reduce murder charges to manslaughter, while others do not allow evidence on the
battered child syndrome and give stiff sentences. Ron Sonenshine, Mother Wants Son
Tried as a Juvenile, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1993, at A16.
209. Janes, 850 P.2d at 503.
210. Ensign, supra note 25, at 1629.
211. Colwell, supra note 42, at 103. Children always play "catch-up" in every area of
the law. Margolick, supra note 64, at 1. But "we are now seeing the incipient stages of a
movement, one that recognizes an abused child's right to act in self-defense, just as bat-
tered women do." Id.
212. For battered women, jurors often wonder why she did not leave, believe she asked
for it, or believe that wife beating is acceptable. Jurors may also believe that the woman
enjoyed the abuse. Jurors do not take into account the economic hardships for the woman
if she does leave, or a fear for her safety or the safety of her children. See Ensign, supra
note 25, at 1633.
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an abused child often fears that leaving would prompt a violent and per-
haps deadly assault on other family members. In the interests of fairness,
such misconceptions cannot be left to the jury when deciding the fate of a
child. Therefore, it is critical that the jury have all relevant evidence in
order to render an informed verdict.
Opponents of self-defense claims in parricide cases argue that imposing
more lenient sentences on children who kill or allowing a defense of self-
defense will be "tantamount to declaring open season on parents. 21 3
Creating a defense for children who kill, however, does not create a right
to kill because of past mistreatment; it merely provides a framework for
people to understand why the battered person could not survive without
killing. "It does not call for special treatment, but for equal and individu-
alized treatment under the law."2 4 Allowing claims of self-defense to
succeed will not result in children randomly committing parricide.215 De-
fendants will still have to meet the traditional requirements of self-de-
fense, and "the history of abuse is simply to show the reasonableness of
the abuse victim's beliefs." '216
IV. CONCLUSION
The actions of the Texas legislature and the holding of the Supreme
Court of Washington in Janes should be a model for other legislatures and
jurisdictions. Both measures recognize the importance of allowing a self-
defense claim and admitting expert testimony at trial. Not only must the
history of abuse be explained to the jury, but expert testimony must be
allowed to explain the effects of the abuse on the child's perceptions.
These complex psychological principles are outside the understanding of
the average juror. With similar changes in all states, all children will re-
ceive the rights currently afforded to children in Texas and Washington.
States must respond if the legal system is to eliminate the inequalities that
exist under the current system. Statutory response takes case-by-case dis-
cretion away from the trial judge and gives all children with the same
claims equal protection under the law.
As a matter of law, people have the right to protect themselves from
213. See, e.g., Timnick, supra note 5, at 2.
214. Rodwan, supra note 73, at 64.
215. Van Sambeek, supra note 1, at 105.
216. Id. "The defense is not a general license to kill parents for one time incidents; an
ongoing abusive relation must be shown and the traditional self-defense elements must be
met." Id.
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unlawful harm inflicted by others.217 The traditional notions of self-de-
fense, however, are an inadequate defense for children protecting them-
selves from a lifetime of severe and unthinkable abuse.21 These children
are turning to the courts for justice, only to be turned away. An in-
creased understanding of parricide within the legal community is crucial.
Moreover, states must achieve uniformity of law for all children. Women
have largely won the right to present expert testimony at trial if they mur-
der their husbands or lovers.219 Giving children the legal protection they
desperately need is the next logical step in the process. In all parricide
cases, the jury must consider whether the defendant acted in self-defense,
which is only accomplished if the history of the abuse is admitted at trial.
Furthermore, since the principles involving the abuse are beyond the
common knowledge of the average juror, an expert must explain what
effects the abuse has on the child's perceptions. Only when all children in
all states are accorded these rights will justice be served.
Jamie Heather Sacks
217. Rodwan, supra note 73, at 64.
218. In a typical criminal case, the relevant evidence relates only to the one specific
incident that led to the murder. When abused children kill their parents, however, inci-
dents from the moment of birth are not only relevant, but critical in enabling the jury to
understand why the children acted as they did. "The heart of a parricide defense is the
child abuse prosecution of the dead parent. The parent must be held accountable in death
for the abuse [he or] she visited against [a] child in life." MoNES, supra note 3, at 12. The
attorney in these cases must "reconstruct in painstaking detail the relationship between
child and parent." Id. It has been suggested that when a child under 18 years has killed a
parent, the district attorney's office should immediately conduct a parallel child abuse in-
vestigation. The prosecutor should be required to put down in writing the reasons for
deciding to prosecute or not. This would provide a standard for "determining the prosecu-
tion of parricide cases." Coiwell, supra note 42, at 103 (quoting attorney Paul Mones).
219. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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